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Animating Archaeology: Local Theories and  
Conceptually Open-ended Methodologies
We use ‘ontology’, here, to mean the possibility of 
giving credence to other worlds, not simply as a noble 
relativizing but ultimately hypocritical gesture but 
as a means to force the production of new material 
concepts. We argue that ‘ontological breakthrough’ 
(Henare et al. 2007) in archaeology is possible if indig-
enous theories are taken seriously as ontologies rather 
than epistemologies and combined with insights from 
Western theories of materiality that reveal matter as 
ontologically relational and inherently indeterminate. 
Animism, then, is not a resource for theory but a 
source of theory.
Archaeological references to ethnographies 
serve to enhance or measure the accuracy of our 
interpretations, and have proven a productive source 
of analogies for past life and as illustrative material 
for theoretical debate, especially around the notion 
of ‘object agency’ (e.g. Gell 1998; see Brown & Walker 
2008). The philosophical underpinnings of animist 
beliefs and practices are rarely treated as theory in 
their own right, but rather as mistaken epistemolo-
gies. In contrast, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2006, 
16) has argued that to avoid such ‘epistemological 
pick pocketing’ we must treat non-Western theories 
in a ‘symmetrical’ way to western theories (sensu 
Animists’ theories of matter must be given equivalence at the level of theory if we are to 
understand adequately the nature of ontological difference in the past. The current model 
is of a natural ontological continuum that connects all cultures, grounding our culturally 
relativist worldviews in a common world. Indigenous peoples’ worlds are thought of as 
fascinating but ultimately mistaken ways of knowing the world. We demonstrate how 
ontologically oriented theorists Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Karen Barad and Tim Ingold 
in conjuncture with an anti-representationalist methodology can provide the necessary 
conditions for alternative ontologies to emerge in archaeology. Anthropo-zoomorphic 
‘body-pots’ from first-millennium ad northwest Argentina anticipate the possibility 
that matter was conceptualized as chronically unstable, inherently undifferentiated, and 
ultimately practice-dependent.
 
Here we have a peculiar ontology which we could 
define (as a) para-ontology, an ontology which is yet 
to be thought.
Giorgio Agamben, ‘What is a paradigm?’
Introduction: from culture to ontology
It is apparent that accounts of ‘non-modern’ worlds 
often insist on wholly other ways of being and of 
conceptualizing reality. As archaeologists, then, how 
do we access and write about worlds that could ‘be’ 
entirely incommensurable with our own world of 
experience? What theoretical and methodological 
tools are necessary for the task? Even to speak of 
multiple ontologies can seem oxymoronic. ‘Ontology’ 
is supposed to carry the weight of the real world, to be 
the ground of action and understanding for archaeo-
logy as for other social and natural disciplines; and so 
to pluralize it sounds like a trivialization, or a ‘post-
modern’ discursive trick. Conversely, the plural risks 
the suggestion of synonymy with ‘culture’. Both of 
these very real possibilities are symptoms of precisely 
the elision of ontological concerns by epistemological 
ones engendered by modernity (Henare et al. 2007; 
Latour 1993; Rollason 2008; Viveiros de Castro 2003). 
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Latour 1993). Similarly, anthropologist Tim Ingold, 
and feminist philosopher and physicist Karen Barad, 
both introduce us to ‘relational ontology’ as a more 
fundamental account of the inherent dynamism and 
mattering of the world than conventional Western 
conceptualization allows. We nonetheless suggest that 
the globalizing tendency of both theorists is problem-
atic. We need to challenge this tendency by refusing 
to grant priority to any particular theoretical position 
and by adopting methodologies that are responsive 
to alternative ontologies. A methodology grounded in 
the potential for alternative worlds to become manifest 
in archaeological material is adapted from Henare et 
al.’s (2007) call to ‘take seriously’ apparently anoma-
lous claims in ethnography about the congruence of 
meaning and thing. 
In this article we explore the theoretical pos-
sibilities of an archaeology which takes ontological 
alterity seriously. We begin by discussing some of 
the key commonalities and differences in arguments 
for new kinds of ontology put forward by Viveiros 
de Castro, Tim Ingold and Karen Barad. We then 
consider how their ideas might enable new ways of 
thinking biomorphic vessels from first-millennium ad 
northwest Argentina (Figs. 1–4). What emerges is the 
possibility that the local ontology was one in which 
a background of ‘indifference’ in bodies and matter 
provoked differentiation through the materialization 
of specific bodies and ‘body-pots’. Once materialized, 
however, bodies and body-pots required constant 
management to maintain their specificity in the face of 
a general instability of matter. ‘Agency’ is then an effect 
of the relations that produce the differentiation and 
stabilization of specific material forms, not their cause.
Archaeology, animism, and ‘object agency’
Traditionally defined as a generalized belief in an 
‘animating’ spirit or soul (Tylor 1993 (1871)), the 
resurgence of interest in animism has included its 
reformulation as a type of relational ontology (e.g. 
Descola 1996; Ingold 2000; Alberti & Bray, this issue). 
Ethnographic accounts of other peoples’ worlds are 
simultaneously the main provocation and the chief 
resource to think about ontological alterity through 
archaeology. The nature of their inclusion has been 
crucial in setting limits to what can be said, and par-
allels the type of credibility afforded such ostensible 
‘beliefs’ (see Alberti & Bray, this issue). Animism 
has been incorporated both as a source for models 
of past life, an analogical usage, and a resource for 
archaeological theory. The notion of ‘object agency’ 
illustrates how productive such incorporation has 
been and its confluence with contemporary materiality 
theory. Also revealed, however, is a potential barrier 
to understanding the world as quite literally ‘other’, 
as the notion itself relies on a ‘leap of faith’.
The incorporation of a focus on animism in 
archaeology has paralleled an interest in exploring 
ethnographic analogies that challenge taken-for-
granted concepts, such as personhood (e.g. Fowler 
2004), gender and sexuality (e.g. Weismantel 2004), 
and materiality (e.g. Parker Pearson et al. 2006). This 
ethnographically rich work has been enormously pro-
ductive of theories and analogies for archaeological 
consumption — i.e. as ‘fuel’ or ‘leverage’ for under-
standing past lives (Fowler 2004; Thomas 2004, 241). 
Broadly we agree with Thomas (2004, 241) when he 
argues that ‘the most important role of ethnographic 
analogy lies not in filling in the gaps in our knowledge 
of prehistoric societies but in troubling and disrupting 
what we think we already know’. Nonetheless, models 
based on the identification of material correlates and 
the application of analogies are likely to recover varia-
tions of particular epistemologies (worldviews), rather 
than ontologies (worlds) precisely because of the 
tendency to reduce others’ ontologies to epistemolo-
Figure 1. Map of northwest Argentina showing 
extension of La Candelaria and San Francisco cultural 
material around the Eastern Valleys or Yungas.
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gies in the present. In other words, epistemological 
concerns posit culture or belief as a lens through which 
we ‘know’ a singular the world, whereas ontology is 
concerned with what it is we consider ‘the world’ to 
be. The difference is one between ‘how we know’ and 
‘what there is’ — we tend to assume that the latter is a 
universal given and the former culturally variable. As 
such, analogies will likely remain fascinating episte-
mological alternatives to a Western worldview (what 
we ‘know’), rather than alternative ontologies (what 
is real to us), if a uni-natural model remains dominant 
in archaeology (see Viveiros de Castro 1998; 2003). 
Despite the value of agentive notions of matter and 
things, we argue that ‘object agency’ exposes a lack 
of commitment to other peoples’ worlds and theories, 
acting as a cognitive trap that prevents archaeologists 
from launching a fully ontological inquiry. The issue 
is what status archaeologists afford others’ claims 
and how we allow such notions to infiltrate or affect 
our theories.
Recent theories of materiality in archaeology, 
especially in relation to the notion of object agency, 
clearly converge with ethnographic accounts of 
other peoples’ relations to their environment and 
locally-defined notions of agency (e.g. Connoller 
2004; Ingold 2000; Sillar 2004). A stress on the active 
role of material culture (Hodder 1986) has evolved 
into thinking of objects or material as agents (e.g. 
Knappett & Malafouris 2008). Fairly widely accepted, 
the idea is conceptually uncomplicated — things do, 
after all, make us do things. When referring to the 
potential agency of materials or objects, the notion 
of ‘secondary agency’, popularized by Gell (1998), 
helped convince people of the analytical legitimacy of 
such non-human agents. The term implies a distinc-
tion between ‘human agency’ and a kind of ‘object 
agency’ as its derivative (e.g. Robb 2005). In particular 
circumstances certain things can act as stand-ins for 
agents through a process of abduction. Some objects 
clearly do have natural properties that mean they quite 
literally can ‘act on’ people (for example trees fall) and 
people act as if objects could act (for example Alfred 
Gell and his Toyota car). In the latter case, it is seen to 
be unimportant whether such beliefs are true; what is 
significant is that people act towards things as if they 
had agency. Non-Western peoples’ beliefs in animacy 
were a key inspiration for Gell (1998) and continue to 
impact archaeology through his work. As Brown & 
Emery (2008, 302) contend, activity between human 
and non-human agents can be revealed once the mod-
ern dichotomy ‘that splits the world into people and 
things’ has been suspended and we ‘seriously accept 
that some of what we recover in the archaeological 
record reflects daily interactions between human and 
important nonhuman agents’.
Even though the potential for archaeological 
interpretation and theory building on the basis of 
analogies with animist practices is clear, they are 
fundamentally limited when it comes to uncovering 
past ontologies because the ‘leap of faith’ required 
to understand ontological difference is ultimately 
not taken. At root is a confusion of ontological with 
epistemological claims. As Viveiros de Castro (2003) 
has noted, other peoples’ ontological commitments 
(their worlds) have been converted by anthropology 
into epistemologies (worldviews). As such, the incom-
mensurability of other peoples’ worlds with ours 
can only ever be understood at the level of ‘cultural’ 
difference; their ontologies can only be more-or-less 
mistaken, fragmentary and partial ‘representations’ 
of our singular ‘ontology’, synonymous with ‘nature’. 
Consequently, what we see in the use of interpretive 
ethnographic analogies and notions such as ‘object 
agency’ is a greater acceptance of epistemological 
diversity, but not necessarily a means to access other 
ontologies. In fact, the notion of ‘object agency’, 
especially in its ‘secondary agency’ form, relies on the 
researcher’s conversion of an ontological claim into an 
epistemological one, allowing us to adopt a relativist 
stance in relation to others’ beliefs about the world 
without actually subscribing to such beliefs (a form 
of ‘hypocrisy’: Viveiros de Castro 2002, 132–3). Thus, 
our apparent commitment to their beliefs masks the 
absence of our belief in their actual commitments. 
Procedural equivalence in theory 
The potential for archaeology to uncover ontological 
alterity partly lies in sidestepping the elision of onto-
logical claims by epistemological ones and realizing 
the potential in others’ theories of the world. Viveiros 
de Castro (2002, 115; 2003) has explored what hap-
pens when ‘the native’s discourse functions within 
the anthropologist’s discourse in such a way (that) 
it produces a reciprocal “knowledge-effect” on the 
latter’. He asks:
(W)hat happens when we take native thought seri-
ously? When the anthropologist’s aim ceases to be to 
explain, interpret, contextualize and rationalize this 
thought, and becomes one of using it, drawing out 
its consequences, and ascertaining the effects it may 
produce on our own? (Viveiros de Castro 2003, 11)
In apparent agreement, Ingold (2006, 19) argues we 
should ‘reanimate’ Western thought on the basis of 
rethinking indigenous animism. A subtle difference 
is that while Ingold (e.g. 2006, 19) offers a corrective 
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to our misconceptions of how the world ‘really is’ on 
the basis of animists’ accounts, Viveiros de Castro (e.g. 
2004a) rehabilitates indigenous thought as an intel-
lectual resource for problematizing Western categories 
of thought and the notion of ‘a world as it really is’, 
whether relational or otherwise. Neither is the answer 
to privilege other peoples’ accounts of the world, as in 
nativism (which is not Ingold’s project), but rather to 
engage other peoples’ ontological or conceptual work as 
‘procedurally equivalent’ to what we do as anthropolo-
gists; properly speaking, their theories are anthropolo-
gies too (Viveiros de Castro 2003; 2004a, 4; 2006, 16).
The taking seriously of native thought, then, 
means that instead of neutralizing it through the 
application of universal concepts, it is treated as 
philosophically challenging, a potential equivalent to 
western philosophical doctrines (Viveiros de Castro 
2003). Viveiros de Castro (e.g. 1998; 2004a,b) applies 
his argument that Amazonian thought as thought 
should impact anthropology and ‘humanity’ by think-
ing through the implications of ‘perspectivist’ theory. 
He uses the label ‘perspectivism’ to designate a ‘type 
of cosmology’ common to Amazonian groups, but also 
to intervene in the relativism/universalism antinomy 
through a consideration of the nature/culture question 
as it manifests itself in Amazonian thought (2003, 5–6; 
2006, 14). Instead, therefore, of the notion of a unitary 
nature and many cultures each with its own cultural 
perspective on that nature (i.e. multiculturalism), 
perspectivism relies on the notion of ‘transpecific 
personhood’ in which ‘souls’ (human and non-human) 
share a common origin and unity, while bodies and 
affects are the seat of difference (Castro de Viveiros 
1998; 2004a, 3, 6). One’s world (nature) is dependent 
on the body that one occupies. However, one shares 
concepts with other ‘souls’; therefore, how one sees 
the world will remain the same across species. Instead 
of multiculturalism and uninaturalism (the dominant 
Western model), one gets uniculturalism and multi-
naturalism: a unitary or constant epistemology and 
variable or plural ontologies.
Perspectivism entails a rethinking of the nature 
of relations. In a reconceptualization of anthropology’s 
fundamental task of comparison, or translation, Vivei-
ros de Castro (2004a, 18) shows that to talk of being 
related in the West implies having something in com-
mon; perspectival relationality, in contrast, is founded 
on ‘difference rather than sameness’. The distinction 
between the two modes of relation is revealed in the 
use of ‘brother’ as the common idiom of relatedness 
in the west versus ‘brother-in-law’ or ‘cross cousin’ 
in Amazonia. The first mode implies unity through 
a common relation to a third term; in the second 
mode the relation is one of diametric opposition, i.e. 
‘the terms are linked by that which separates them’ 
(Strathern 1992, as cited in Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 
19). The difference emerges once we consider that the 
underlying premise of perspectivism is a background 
of commonality, trans-specific ‘cultural unity’. Estab-
lishing a relation is then to ‘differentiate indifference’, 
to ‘insert a difference where indifference was implied’ 
(Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 18–19). By contrast, in 
the West ‘to relate is to assimilate, to unify, and to 
identify’, producing analyses that posit a continuity 
on the basis of a shared ontology (‘nature’). In the 
perspectivist model, to relate is to differ: ‘translation 
(is) an operation of differentiation — a production of 
difference — that connects the two discourses to the 
precise extent to which they are not saying the same 
thing’ about synonymic concepts. For anthropology, 
the danger of the Western mode lies in imagining an 
‘overly simplified’ relation between it and its object, 
resulting from ‘a desire for ontological monism’, that 
is, relations of identity such as that imagined by social 
construction — the distinction between a ‘real’ world 
of brute facts and ‘human world’ of institutional ones 
(Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 16, 20).
A world in flux: matter’s inherent dynamism
To assume we need to know exactly the metaphysical 
underpinnings of alternative ontological possibilities 
seems to suggest we need to re-ground other peoples’ 
theories in the ‘truths’ of our natural sciences. That is 
not our intention. Rather, understanding the funda-
mentally relational ontology of the physical world in 
terms of our own, scientific theories further prepares 
the ground for imagining the possibility that other 
peoples’ worlds are as they say they are. In other 
words, pluralizing ‘ontologies’ may not be enough 
to break a habit of mind that refuses to grant a literal 
rather than metaphorical presence to indigenous 
peoples’ worlds or the past.
The physical world as objective fact has been 
taken as the ground of reality since at least the advent 
of modernity (Latour 1993; Viveiros de Castro 1998; 
2003; see Thomas 2004). The remit of science has been 
to reveal the immutable yet hidden truths of nature. 
Tim Ingold (2000; 2006; 2007a,b) and Karen Barad 
(2003; 2007), as two different disciplinary versions of a 
‘Western theoretical animism’, challenge the Cartesian 
assumption of an a priori separation of the world into 
two ontological domains: matter and meaning (Barad 
2007), the physical world and the world of ideas 
(Ingold 2007a, 3). Their solution is to re-invigorate 
matter and re-materialize meaning through practice. 
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Barad’s use of matter as an ontological category and 
Ingold’s focus on materials as opposed to matter share 
a concern with the dynamic, ultimately relationally 
constituted, and inherently indeterminate state of 
‘nature’. According to Barad (2007, 151 emphasis in 
original), ‘matter is substance in its intra-active becoming 
— not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency’.
To demonstrate how the generalized ontologi-
cal indeterminacy is resolved into local determinacy, 
Barad (2007, 81–3, 99–106) develops the example of the 
‘wave-particle duality paradox’ of quantum physics 
in which matter is shown to act as both a wave or a 
particle, yet these are mutually exclusive states. In 
Barad’s reading, there is no paradox: the entirety 
of the material conditions necessary to conduct the 
experiment produces the specific state of the object 
measured (in this case, an electron). A wave or particle 
is produced within the specific ‘phenomenon’ that 
includes both apparatus and object. In other words, 
there are no independent, individual ‘things’ (objects, 
subjects, etc.) with pre-determined properties or 
identities, only ‘things-in-phenomena’. The concepts 
‘wave’ and ‘particle’ are not properties intrinsic to 
the electron, but are quite literally embodied by the 
larger ‘apparatus’, so that each concept is material 
only in a very specific sense. The specific material 
conditions of an apparatus determine the boundaries 
and properties of the measured object as well as the 
measuring apparatus.
For Ingold, the relational constitution of being 
consists of ‘a field’ of ‘interwoven lines’ — or a 
‘meshwork’ — in contrast to interconnected points, 
or a set of pre-determined objects (Ingold 2006, 13). 
The relation ‘is a line along which materials flow, mix 
and mutate’ (Ingold 2007b, 35). According to Ingold 
(2007b, 35), ‘every thing’ is itself an entanglement of 
relations, including both persons and things, which 
are not ‘nodes’ or something qualitatively different 
from the relations themselves, but rather ‘bundles 
of relations’. The environment itself, as a ‘domain of 
entanglement’, consists of the interwoven growth of 
many such relational beings.
Similarly, for Barad, relational ‘phenomena’ and 
not objects are ontologically primitive and therefore 
constitutive of physical reality (Barad 2007, 140, 151). 
Things exist only in relation to other things. In contrast 
to a substance ontology, subjects and objects with 
determinate boundaries and properties are outcomes 
of relationships and do not precede them. An impor-
tant consequence is that what we call the ‘objective 
referent’ to which we can properly attribute properties, 
predicates, attributes, and so on, are not objects and 
subjects but rather the phenomenon as a whole (i.e. 
both object and apparatus). Ingold also insists that 
things or materials do not have pre-occurent proper-
ties but are ‘processual and relational’; properties are 
histories rather than attributes, as illustrated in his 
point about the properties of stone as opposed to the 
notion of the ‘materiality’ of stone:
Stoniness, then, is not in the stone’s ‘nature’, in 
its materiality. Nor is it merely in the mind of the 
observer or practitioner. Rather, it emerges through 
the stone’s involvement in its total surroundings—
including you, the observer—and from the manifold 
ways in which it is engaged in the currents of the 
lifeworld. (Ingold 2007a, 15)
Just as ‘electrons’ do not bring with them properties 
that pre-exist the phenomenon in which they are 
manifested or measured, the properties of stone are 
not internal to it as ‘stoniness’. Properly speaking, 
the properties of stone are properties of the larger 
phenomenon of which the stone and observer are 
constitutive parts.
If things were to stop their ‘action’ of relating 
they would no longer be. If relations are ontologi-
cally prior, then the world is inherently animated 
and dynamic. In Ingold’s account, life is continually 
in a process of generation, of re-birth; agency is 
synonymous with life, while for Barad, agency is an 
effect of ongoing ‘intra-actions’, the causal structure 
that differentiates ‘thing-in-phenomena’. In contrast 
to the notion of ‘object agency’, then, agency is not 
separated into two different types — intentional and 
effective. This notion of agency is quite different from 
simply refusing humans sole propriety over agency, as 
the democratizing notions of ‘secondary agent’ (Gell 
1998) and ‘actant’ (Latour 1993) imply. As Sillar (this 
issue) argues, agency is the effect of relations (see also 
Gardner 2008; Gell 1998; Joyce & Lopiparo 2005; Robb 
2008), but in Barad’s and Ingold’s accounts, those rela-
tions are not between pre-existing entities, but are the 
outcome of the differentiating impulse that produces 
determinate entities in the first place. As such, agency 
is less a choice between external natural causes and 
human-authored intentional action, and more an effect 
of ongoing material-discursive practices that produce 
both human and non-human in the first place.
Both Barad and Ingold propose ‘meta-ontolo-
gies’, quite different from traditional substance ontolo-
gies yet with the same implied claim to universality. 
Barad’s ontology provides a generalized explanation 
for the mechanism of ontological constitution and 
reconfiguration, which is both physical and meaning-
ful, but which is radically open to reconfiguration 
and pluralization. Ethnography is central to Ingold’s 
world, but it is still a singular world. We are left with 
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the problem of the relationship between these global, 
and implicitly singular theories and ontologies, and 
the status of other peoples’ ontological claims. A 
similar point could be made about the ‘meta-ontology’ 
under-girding ‘symmetrical’ approaches in archaeol-
ogy (e.g. Olsen 2003; Witmore 2007; see also Henare 
et al. 2007, 7). To propose a relational ontology based 
on matter’s inherent dynamism solves the problem of 
needing an animating human hand to enable agency 
and action, but it does not necessarily place us on a 
path to ontological alterity (multiple worlds) such as 
the Amazonian ontologies discussed by Viveiros de 
Castro. This requires a further step which depends 
upon taking seriously the ‘cross reality’ challenges 
which emerge from anthropological and archaeologi-
cal accounts of other worlds.
Open-ended conceptuality
In a discussion of the methodological implications 
of new theories of ‘agency’ in archaeology, Dobres & 
Robb (2005) argued that theory, method, and method-
ology need to be thought and practised together rather 
than sequentially. Drawing on Viveiros de Castro’s 
theories, Henare et al. (2007) propose a methodology 
for anthropology that gets at ontological alterity. In 
line with Dobres & Robb (2005), they argue that theory 
production must be ongoing rather than pre-deter-
mined. Present analytic approaches are problematic, 
they argue, because they rely on a ‘classificatory 
repertoire intended for refinement and expansion’ 
(Henare et al. 2007, 5) and thus deny the possibility 
of ‘ontological breakthrough’ because data are fitted 
into pre-existing schemas. In contrast, they develop 
a heuristic concept of the ‘thing’, which is treated as 
a more-or-less empty signifier (much like Strathern’s 
(1988) ‘person’); the things themselves as they are 
encountered act as ‘conduits for concept production’ 
(Henare et al. 2007, 7). New analytical frameworks 
and theory are produced as a result of the encounter, 
not prior to it. 
This methodological minimalism opens up 
analyses, enabling apparent anomalies to provide a 
route into ontological alterity (see Bray, this issue). 
Conventionally, anomalous things are treated as 
epistemological conundrums the solutions to which 
are thought to lie in expanding familiar interpretive 
categories to encompass them (Henare et al. 2007, 6; 
e.g. Holbraad 2007 on the history of mana interpreta-
tions). To get around the conventional separation of a 
thing and its meaning, Henare et al. (2007, 2–3) adopt 
the anti-representationalist strategy of ‘radical essen-
tialism’ by ‘taking things in the field as they present 
themselves, rather than immediately assuming that 
they signify, represent, or stand for something else’. 
Holbraad’s (2007) work among the Ifá diviners of Cuba 
reveals the powder-power, aché, as neither an isolat-
able concept nor thing. Approached by an Ifá diviner 
who thinks powder is power and vice versa, we need 
not assume that our representations are inadequate; 
nor need we try to explain why someone (or some 
‘culture’) might think powder were power. Holbraad 
(2007) shows that refusing a priori the separation 
between thing and concept enables him to ‘think 
through’ a new concept (powder-power) and explain 
Ifá ontology as constituted by motility and transcend-
ence. In another example, Marshall (2008) examines 
the confusion experienced by European explorers 
and traders attempting to distinguished persons of 
high rank among the Nuu-chah-Nulth people of 
the North American Northwest Coast despite their 
almost complete disregard for status-specific dress 
or insignia. The only example described was a rain 
hat depicting whaling scenes presumed to mark out 
a chief. But even the rain hats did not, in fact could 
not, ‘signify’ rank or status because persons were not 
stabilized and marked out as particular kinds of being, 
or understood to have fixed identities. Instead people 
needed to maintain themselves in a state of constant 
motion, shifting and transforming between positions 
and states. In this process material objects were taken 
up to enable such movement, not to designate, display 
or hold steady an achieved position. Little wonder the 
European newcomers were perplexed.
Refusing the separation of concept and thing 
is not confined to anthropology or archaeology. It 
is happening within the physical sciences too. The 
revelatory potential of anomalies also drives Barad’s 
(2007) work (for example, the ‘wave-particle duality 
paradox’). If within the terms of their own theories the 
hard sciences are able to encompass the possibility that 
physical reality itself, as conceived by Western science, 
is fundamentally relational, then concept production 
directed at archaeological material must also encom-
pass the virtualities of its physicality. Specifically, matter 
as dynamic and continuously open to reconfiguration 
and agency-as-effect or ‘in life’ are allied notions with 
heuristic potential. Archaeologists and anthropologists 
have different opportunities for recognizing and uncov-
ering anomalies. Holbraad’s and Viveiros de Castro’s 
anthropological accounts have an underdeveloped 
sense of the ‘matter’ of the thing. In contrast, because 
of the irreducibly material nature of archaeological 
‘concept-things’, their ‘prosaic’ character (Holbraad 
2007, 208) will necessarily have greater weight in the 
investigation and rethinking of concepts.
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Towards ‘ontological breakthrough’ in first-
millennium ad northwest Argentina
Research currently being conducted by Alberti on 
materials from northwest Argentina, particularly 
biomorphic pots, is the grounds for elaboration of 
the terms in which ontological difference can become 
intelligible (Alberti 2006; 2007; Figs. 1–4). This is not 
a case study or example, which would entail actually 
understanding the logic of the ontology of the pots, 
but rather an extension of the theoretical discussion. 
A contrast is drawn between two possible approaches 
to the Argentinian material in order to illuminate the 
difference between a conventional interpretation, 
which rests on questions of an epistemological nature, 
and an approach which attempts to take ontological 
alterity seriously. The first, more traditional approach 
would be to treat the pots as ‘representations’ of an 
animist (or perspectivist) worldview. Here, analogies 
with ethnographic parallels are useful. The second 
approach, and the one advocated here for getting at 
ontological difference, is that ‘worldviews’ is not what 
we are after at all but precisely ‘worlds’, in which case 
perspectivism as a set of theoretical possibilities must 
be adopted in order to understand the pots.
The anthropo-zoomorphic vessels and burial 
material from the La Candelaria and San Francisco 
region of northwest Argentina during the first mil-
lennium ad reveal exaggerated anatomical features, 
human/bird or human/animal ‘hybrid’ forms, and 
biomorphic protrusions or ‘mamelones’ (Figs. 2–3; 
Alberti 2007; Goretti 2006). There are also exceptional 
pieces of finer quality that depict single or twined ani-
mals in a naturalistic style. Much of the material was 
recovered by collectors, so contextual data are sparse. 
Poorly preserved settlements with small assemblages 
of urn burials in proximity predominate; the material 
recovered archaeologically largely comes from such 
burials (Baldini et al. 2003; Heredia 1968; 1975). While 
the material shares characteristics with a tradition that 
encompasses many of the cultures of the wider area, 
no canon for the imagery has been developed (Alberti 
2007; DeMarrais 2007; Lazzari 2005). 
When faced with this body of material the imme-
diate question is what does it mean? A conventional 
answer is that it represents the beliefs of past peoples. 
The task of archaeologists is then to re-construct 
more-or-less accurate interpretations of the underly-
ing meanings inherent in the vessel forms and their 
imagery. Since the pots and their imagery fit within 
a generally Andean framework of beliefs, they are 
taken to indicate or to have been involved in ritual 
and other activities (e.g. DeMarrais 2007; González 
1977; Llamazares & Sarasola 2006). Thus, here a focus 
on animism would entail ‘reading off’ such meanings 
from the pots, perhaps on the basis of analogy with 
ethnohistoric or ethnographic accounts. As such, in an 
earlier publication Alberti (2007) made the case that 
the location of the La Candelaria and San Francisco 
cultures, wedged, as it seemed to him, between the 
Andes and the lowlands, enabled him to read off 
from his material Amazonian cosmological content, 
an analogical usage.
Following representationalist logic, analogical 
correspondence could be sought between the form of 
the vessels and the content of Amazonian myth. The La 
Candelaria material corresponds well with some ele-
ments of Amazonian cosmology. The hybrid pot forms 
(e.g. Fig. 3) recall the widespread Amazonian belief 
in a transition point from mythic time when humans 
and animals were not yet clearly distinguished to 
current-day discrete identities (Lévi-Strauss 1969). 
Alternatively, the hybrid figures could be taken to 
represent shamanic journeys, where distinct points 
of view were achieved by hallucinogen-induced 
corporeal transformation (e.g. Llamazares & Sarasola 
2006; Pérez Gollán 2000). More adventurously, the 
biomorphic protrusions and general unsettledness 
of form could indicate the existence of ‘the mythical 
riverrun of fluent metamorphosis’ that continues its 
Figure 2. La Candelaria-style ceramic vessel showing 
biomorphic ‘protrusions’. (Museo de La Universidad 
Nacional de Tucumán; photograph, B. Alberti.)
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‘turbulent course’ below the separate surface of the 
bodies that separate species (e.g. Figs. 2–4; Viveiros 
de Castro 2007, 159). As such, an argument could be 
made that the vessels are the material embodiment 
of myth manifested through the establishment of 
a figurative art tradition, three-dimensional beliefs 
given greater force by their material permanence. 
However, analogical reasoning, while important for 
laying out the possibilities of different worlds, does 
not necessarily actualize the ontological potential of 
those worlds. The logic of the myths themselves, if 
treated as ‘the discourse of the Given’ (Wagner 1978, 
as cited in Viveiros de Castro 2008) rather than stories, 
also reveals the unlikelihood of the pots representing 
mythic events. If identity conceived as ‘disorganized 
bodies’ (Viveiros de Castro 2007, 158) is an ongoing 
state, a truth established by myth itself, then to suggest 
that the pot ‘represents’ this ‘story’ is to remove the 
pot from that world. To follow the logic of the theory 
in its own terms would necessarily entail understand-
ing the pot as part of the same ‘ongoing’ process of 
identity and world formation. It is quite probable that 
the figurative material played an active role in ritual 
(e.g. DeMarrias 2007, 255; Llamazares & Sarasola 2006, 
64–5) and that a connection exists between present-day 
Amazonian cosmologies and the archaeological mate-
rial. A representationalist approach assumes that the 
thing as sign vehicle reveals a story or set of cultural 
beliefs inscribed in it and read off it. But, as demon-
strated, a simple representationalist logic is actually 
counter to the terms of ‘perspectivist’ theory itself. To 
adopt such an approach to understanding the mate-
rial — ‘reading off’ myth or worldviews — merely 
unreflexively imposes the separation thing-meaning. 
This is not to say that forms of representation did not 
exist, but they would not necessarily be of the kind 
that we would immediately recognize (see Viveiros 
de Castro 2007 for an alternative Amazonian logic of 
representation). Thus, assuming a straightforward 
representationalist approach to the meaning of the 
pots undermines the possibilities of discovering the 
ontological logic they embody.
A different procedure is required for archaeology 
to reveal anomalies as such, one which is literalist (i.e. 
non-representationalist) and suspicious of potentially 
‘neutralizing’ universal concepts, such as ‘body’ or 
‘gender’ (Viveiros de Castro 2003). For example, the 
La Candelaria pots viewed conventionally are ‘things’ 
(pots) with a specific form and decorative aspect 
which is understood as the imprint of culture, i.e. as 
a representation of a body. In contrast to Holbraad’s 
(2007) powder–power analysis, the confounding 
thing-concept is already fully entailed in the initial 
encounter. A twofold anomaly, this is in fact a ‘pot-
body’, where neither ‘thing’ (pot) nor ‘concept’ (body, 
as representation) matches exactly what we expect. 
An array of ontological possibilities are opened up, 
our access to which will be guided by the ‘anomolies’ 
of the material (once released from the thing/concept 
dualism) and the theory we bring to bear. General 
possibilities include a notion that all body-pots are 
ontologically equivalent; that the matter of flesh and 
the matter of ceramic pot ‘bear’ material truths in the 
same way (tattoos and engraved marks on pots are 
not distinct; or to break a pot and to break a body has 
the same material consequences). All of which is not 
to say that local representational regimes did not exist 
or are not, potentially, relevant to the understanding 
of ‘body-pot’. However, the logic of ‘representation’ 
Figure 3. La Candelaria-style zoomorphic ceramic 
vessel. (Museo de La Universidad Nacional de Tucumán; 
photograph, B. Alberti.)
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cannot be assumed and should be explored in each 
case (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 2007). Nonetheless, the 
relationship between body and pot is likely more than 
metaphorical. For example, when indications of sex 
on body-pots are found among the corpus (e.g. Fig. 
4) the conventional question is one of seeing through 
the quirks of the local representational idiom of 
gender to the biological body that is presumed to be 
its referent. Within Western taxonomic schemes the 
presence or absence of certain sexed characteristics 
are used to place the figure into one of two categories 
on the basis of their culturally specific ‘representation’ 
of sex (e.g. Scattolin 2006; see Alberti 2006). Figure 4 
is one of several vaguely similar forms. The shallow 
groove impressed in the clay between the ‘legs’ along 
with the presence of ‘nipples’ conventionally are taken 
to indicate sex, enabling the figure to be categorized 
as a representation of a female. The consequence, of 
course, is that any specifics (i.e. potential anomalies) 
are lost within the general analytic frame of sex/gender 
and binary sex. In contrast, on the basis of the mate-
rial itself we could produce a new, locally conceived 
theoretical framework that built from such apparent 
anomalies. It is not necessarily the case that we have 
represented here a ‘belief’ that bodies were considered 
pot-like or pots were considered body-like, a simple 
metaphorical relationship; rather, the concept ‘body-
pot’ is a literal element of La Candelaria ontology. 
Once we treat the material as it is presented to us, 
the question What cultural variations of a given body 
are revealed? gives way to What is a body, what is a pot? 
or even What is gender, what is sex? In other words, 
what are the theoretical possibilities of this specific 
body-pot?
To animate these pots means thinking through 
them in terms of appropriate theories that are likely 
to reveal their alterity as ontological rather than 
epistemological. Examining the pots in light of the 
specific theoretical postulates of Barad, Ingold and 
perspectivism, two inter-related possibilities emerge: 
that matter and physical form were considered inher-
ently unstable, and that the pots can be understood as 
inserting a difference and therefore bringing into local 
determinacy a potential belonging to indeterminate 
(or indifferent) but dynamic background matter.
Working with the concept of the ‘chronically 
unstable body’ elaborated on the basis of the theories 
of the northwest Amazon group, the Wari’, by Apare-
cida Vilaça (2005; see Conklin 2001), Alberti (2007) 
argued that the La Candelaria and San Francisco pots 
and skeletal material indicated a concern with ‘shor-
ing up’ the body, preventing its transformation into 
another body with another point of view. Combining 
the perspectivist theory of the corporeal seat of iden-
tity with Ingold’s (2007a) argument that ‘materials’ are 
flows, and properties ‘histories’, and Barad’s (2007) 
insistence that matter is inherently indeterminate, one 
can argue that the volumes and forms of the ceramics 
do not so much ‘represent’ anything as ‘participate 
in’ an everyday concern with the instability of mat-
ter. Ingold’s (2007a) challenge to the common-sense 
durability of matter, and his critique of notions such 
as ‘materiality’ which lead to essentialism (i.e. stone is 
hard because of its ‘stoniness’), stretches the concept of 
matter as usually deployed in archaeology. The logic 
of the body-pot (i.e. as an extension of the concept 
body over pot, and likewise of the concept pot — as 
materials, not finished object — over body) reveals 
matter itself as conceptualized as unstable. This, then, 
was its ‘natural’ condition.
Figure 4. La Candelaria-style anthropomorphic body-pot. 
(Museo de la Universidad Nacional de Tucumán Museo; 
photograph, B. Alberti.)
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With that general idea in mind, one way to under-
stand specific differences in this material is to think of 
the body-pots as revealing notions about relatedness 
as ‘inserting a difference’ into a background of indif-
ference. As such, the body-pot is not an agglomeration 
of attributes, body parts, sex marks, clay, water etc. 
that are added on successively to a fixed background 
of matter (i.e. the natural world, in a modern sense). 
Barad’s (2007; see above) notion of ‘phenomenon’ 
captures a way to formalize the relationship in which 
a local resolution of generalized indeterminacy occurs 
and specific objects are crystallized out in determinate 
ways. Rather than bodies, sex, pots, and matter being 
thought of in an additive sense, their forms could be 
seen as a consequence of differentiating out — mak-
ing determinate — certain characteristics, such as 
sex, from a generalized background of indifference. 
Those characteristics materialize as the difference that 
is inserted in order to establish a relation. That differ-
ence does not ‘signify’ sex, or even create a relation 
of ‘identity’ between that pot and a real woman. To 
think in terms of instability and in terms of an indif-
ferent background suggests that the difference ‘sex’ 
makes here is at the literal level of matter. The sexed 
difference is marking and stabilizing that specific pot 
as sexed.
Matter and materials are actively involved in 
their own reconfiguration and in setting the terms of 
their own intelligibility (Barad 2007; Ingold 2007a). 
The existence of a strong correspondence between 
matter, practice and meaning in Barad’s work (2007), 
indicates that ‘matter’ can be seen as inseparable from 
the actions it engenders. As such, separate worlds of, 
on the one hand, obdurate matter, and on the other, 
active practices do not exist. Rather, all processes and 
actions are ‘natural’ ones. Hence, to work on a body, 
a body-pot, or matter, is to ensure their stability as 
part of their natural processes, not as a cultural action 
‘layered over’ stable, inert matter. Among the Wari’, 
the affects that keep a body and therefore a point of 
view stable are such ‘natural practices’ as they are 
not considered cultural over and against a natural 
body (Conklin 2001; Vilaça 2005). In the same way, 
we argue, the on-going ‘mattering’ of the world can 
be conceived analogically as on-going ‘affect’; matter 
too has to behave appropriately and to maintain its 
point of view or intelligibility (Barad 2007). In the 
case of the pots this parallelism between bodies and 
matter can be seen in the way body-pots are treated. 
Body-pots were worked on in an indistinguishable 
process to bodies, arguably to prevent their transfor-
mation and keep their points of view and bodies from 
transforming (Alberti 2007). The specific marks made 
on the body-pot in Figure 4, such as the impressed 
‘genitals’, are affect-driven (i.e. practice-based), aimed 
to provide stability. For example, if ‘times were hard’, 
as has been argued through osteological analyses of 
the La Candelaria culture associated population at Las 
Pirguas caves (Baldini et al. 2003), it could be argued 
that matter was being experienced as increasingly 
unstable and therefore that appropriate affect was 
difficult to achieve, transformation increasingly imma-
nent. Therefore, pots were mended, urn burials were 
re-opened, bodies were increasingly rearticulated, 
burned, or buried in novel ways (Baldini et al. 2003). 
The processes in which such material transformations 
were involved (whether ‘natural’ or ‘cultural’), such as 
the stages of making, using, and eventually depositing 
a body-pot, were all aimed at bringing something into 
being from a generalized background of unindividu-
ated matter and then preventing inappropriate trans-
formation. However, matter was never ‘fixed’ even if 
felt like it was (fired ceramic is harder than raw clay); 
fragility was about appropriate practice (affect), not 
some inherent quality of the ‘substance’ that we under-
stand that material to be or become. The body-pot in 
its alterity reveals itself as the possible embodiment 
of the principle that matter is by its very nature affect 
dependent. The body-pot, therefore, embodies the 
antinomy of stability and instability, the instability of 
matter and the stabilizing effect of practice, whether 
human-authored or not. Consequently, the question 
of agency is reversed: the issue is no longer how 
things get movement (i.e. agency) but rather how 
they stabilize.
Conclusion: chronically unstable theories
The language of ontology is important precisely 
because it counteracts the tendency to see indigenous 
thought as fantasy, which happens when the ‘natives’ 
point of view’ is reduced to a metaphor or worldview 
(Viveiros de Castro 2003, 14). The analogical use of 
animism in archaeology can shed light on an incred-
ible array of cultural practices and beliefs, but it cannot 
reveal the past as any more different than the terms 
of the analogy dictate. In contrast, the theoretical and 
methodological starting point adopted here enables 
us to feel the actual (rather than derived) impact of 
animist theories on our interpretations. Our argument 
is that to get at ontological alterity through the past 
requires an approach that is open to the possibility 
of plural ontologies. ‘Animist’ theories of the world, 
such as perspectivism, present just such possibilities, 
as do contemporary theories of matter, such as those 
of Barad and Ingold. Importantly, we are not simply 
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advocating ‘theoretical eclecticism’ — the outcome has 
to be a specific theory for a specific body of material 
because general frameworks limit our data’s ability to 
‘extend our theoretical imagination’ (Holbraad 2007, 
190). The outcome of the specific analysis presented 
here, that matter was inherently unstable, is suggestive 
that perhaps our theories of matter need to be too. 
‘Source theories’ that problematize ontology are likely 
to enable novelties to emerge from any archaeological 
material. There is no reason to assume that one theory 
is more or less appropriate than another from the 
outset. As such, the relevance of ‘perspectivist’ theory 
for archaeological explanation is not limited to expla-
nations of ‘perspectivists’. Archaeological ontologies 
ought to be singularities emergent from specific data 
and contexts rather than general frameworks applied 
to all cases, and the specific confluence of theories 
and materials (archaeological and otherwise) will 
enable non-predictable, materially different pasts to 
emerge.
Similarly, the categories of Western thought 
through which we operate are clearly obeying a spe-
cific ontological logic. Even so, they are not closed. Just 
as the gaps in dualist structures can be deliberate and 
themselves the object of thought (Viveiros de Castro 
2006; see Alberti & Bray, this issue), the engagement 
between Western categories and archaeological mate-
rial is unscripted even if the terms of the debate are 
given. The traditional concepts of ‘body’ and ‘pot’ 
enable particular pasts to emerge and are archaeologi-
cally indispensable for all sorts of analyses. However, 
archaeological anomalies can also drive the reformula-
tion of categories, whether the goal is to produce new 
concepts (Henare et al. 2007) or to ‘stretch’ our exist-
ing categories of thought (Viveiros de Castro 2006). 
Others are clearly struggling to enable alternative 
ontologies to break through the over-determination 
of dualist structures. For example, Marshall (2000) 
has shown how the tension in Wilson Duff’s account 
of gender in a set of Northwest Coast stone objects 
resulted from his consistently dividing the material 
according to dualistic structures yet being sensitive to 
and searching for a way to articulate the complexity 
of the material. 
The ontology of the past is present in the ways 
in which it is brought into determinate meaning by 
our writing about it. To say that ‘both people and 
pots require work to prevent their transformation’ is 
to suggest a commonality between people and pots 
where one is not expected. To incorporate that idea 
into future production is to change the terms of the use 
of the concepts in the discipline. This is not so much a 
‘proposition’ about the past as an intervention, a work 
of conceptual elaboration in the present. It remains 
to be seen whether the potential ontological alterity 
— the ‘para-ontologies’ — implicit in our material can 
be made to reveal new worlds.
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